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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHARON ROBERTS
Case No.

vs.

TRACKvVORK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY

10862

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment based on a
special verdiuct of a jury wherein a finding was made
in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, and
from the rulings of the Court, denying Plaintiff's motion
for a directed verdict, denying certain of Plaintiff's requests for instructions and from an Order denying Plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On November 9, 1965, the Plaintiff and appellant
herein filed a Complaint against the Defendant for in-
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juries she sustained when she drove her automobile
a1ong
a road located upon the Tooele Army Depot T ~
, ooe"1
County, Utah, and across certain railroad tracks wh' L,
.
d. sa1"d roa d an d w h"1ch tracks were then and
!Cu
mtersecte
~here repaired ~y the Defendant. (R-1). Plaintiff alleged
m her Complamt that the crossmg was left unattended
while being so repaired, with no warning signs to warn
Plaintiff or other motorists using the road of the danger.
ous conditions of the road while so being repaired. Pl;intiff alleges certain in juries sustained when the car which
she was driving struck one of the rails of said track
which was then and there projecting three or four inches
above the other track upon said intersection, thereb 1
creating a hazard; that the bumper of her car struck said
rail, suddenly stopping her car and throwing her against
the steering post with such force and impact that her
lower jaw was broken; her teeth were knocked loose and
had to be removed and other injuries suffered. Plaintiff
alleges in substance that she was using the road in a
lawful manner and driving at a rate of speed not in excess
of 12 miles per hour. Defendant in answer denied the
allegations of Plaintiff's complaint and alleges negligence
and contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff
( R-2 ) . After certain discovery methods as provided by
law had been taken by both of the parties, a pre-trial
conference was held on the 9th day of June, 1966, in
which the issues were defined as hereinabove set forth
(R-7). This case came on for trial the first day of De·
cember, 1966. Plaintiff specifically requested in his request for instructions that the Court direct the jury to
return a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
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Defendant and leave to the jury only the question of the
,,xtent of the damages to the Plaintiff ( R-16).
The Court submitted to the jury six propositions to
be ans,vered in its special verdict ( R-12). The substance
of the findings of the jury in the answer to these propositions \\"aS a general verdict in favor of the Defendant and
a~ainst the Plaintiff. This verdict waus returned on Dec~mbcr 2, 1966 ( R-12). Thereafter the Plaintiff filed
her motion for a new trial and set forth certain grounds
in support of said motion (R-20). The Court thereafter
on January 9, 1967, denied Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff
was not informed of the ruling until most of her time for
,1 ppeal had gone by, but the Court thereafter, based upon
Plaintiff's motion and affidavit (R-21 & 22), extended
Plaintiffs time for appeal (R-23). Plaintiff thereafter
filed Notice of Appeal from the rulings of the Court,
both at the time of the trial as hereinafter set forth, and
from the Court's denial of her motion for new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON RULING
The appellant asks this Court to reverse the ruling
of the trial Court denying plaintiff's motion for a new
trial, based upon the trial Court's refusal to grant a new
trial for the reason set forth in her motion (R-20), and
for the Court's refusal at the time of trial to direct a
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and leave to the jury only the question of damages.
Plaintiff seeks to have this Court make and enter its
order remanding this cast to the District Court for a new
trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant and Respondent herein was 0
.
' n and
pnor to the 5th day of November, 1965, engaged bv h
United States Government in repairing and repl~ ~ e
certain railroad tracks and crossings at the Tooele Acmg
•
11.rm1
Depot m Tooele County, Utah; that on the 5th dav 1
November, while repairing the tracks it left one rail
the tracks projecting from three to four inches above the
other rail and left the crossing otherwise in an unsafe
condition for travel. The Plaintiff on said day was em.
ployed by the Tooele Army Depot, and in the course of
her employment and in the discharge of her duties was
traveling west along said road at the rate of speed of
approximately twelve miles per hour (TR-4, line 6). The
woman who was then and there riding in Plaintiff's automobile, Mrs. Irene Cherry, testified that Plaintiff was
traveling about fifteen miles per hour (TR p. 29, lines
15-23). The only other individual witness was one Clyde
Moore, who testified that the Plaintiff was traveling between 10 and 15 miles per hour and not in excess of
fifteen miles per hour (TR, p. 44, lines 27-29 ) . When
Plaintiff attempted to cross the rail which was left projecting above the other rail, as hereinabove described,
the car she was driving and particularly the bumper
thereof, caught under the rail and stopped the car suddenly, throwing her against the steering wheel of the car,
thereby fracturing her lower jaw and loosening the teeth
of her lower jaw to the point where they all were re·
quired to be removed. (TR, p. 4, lines 9-11.) Evidence
was introduced showing that the track and particularly
the rail in question had been left projecting three or four
inches across the road and intersection and unattended

:f
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and without any warning signals or other devices to warn
the Plaintiff and other users of the road of the danger
which the Defendant had created (TR, p. 11, lines 2730). The jury in its special verdict in response to the
Proposition #3, "The Defendant was negligent in that
the Defendant did not warn the Plaintiff by signs or
otherwise of the danger in crossing the tracks, answered
''True." Further evidence was introduced by medical
testimony of the injuries, pain and suffering of the Plaintiff and of the medical treatment which she was required
to undergo (TR, p. 36-42). It was also shown at the
time of the trial that the Defendant had placed gravel
upon the crossing as a temporary means of making the
crossing passable, which gravel had been partially thrown
out of the location between the rails and the bed (TR,
p. 90, line 1 ) . There was also evidence introduced that
the speed limit upon said road was 30 miles per hour
(TR, p. 22, line 1).
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT.
The trial Court erred in its refusal to direct a verdict
in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and
leave for its consideration only the extent of damages
sustained by the Plaintiff. In this case there was no evidence offered in support of Defendant's position that the
Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. There
was no evidence of excessive speed on the part of the
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Plaintiff. The only testimony of the eye witness , b
vas v
. .
the Plamtiff, Mrs. Cherry, the passenger, and Mr. Cha,
Moore who saw the accident. They each testified th t
the speed of the car did not exceed fifteen miles per ho a.
In this regard the testimony of the Defendant's witne~:·
Mr. Kay Hanson, should be noted. His testimony reflec .
that at most his investigation was of a casual nature
101, lines 2 and 3). Further, that his computations were
not exact and were, in fact, planned so as to come om
even.

(T;'.

Mr. Hanson testified that if the car were going ten
to fifteen miles per hour, it could not have lifted the
rail. He therefore concludes that the car must have been
going faster. His computations are based on a premise
that the rail was down. Mr. Hanson testified that it
would be necessary for 200,000 pounds of force to pull
up the 69 feet of rail and spines. In short, what l\Ir.
Hanson has done is to assume the result he wants and
work his calculations around that result.
The Defendant's next witness, Kenneth Schefski,
testified that a car in normal working condition would
not bottom or touch the bumper to the road. This wit·
ness again assumes a speed of at least twenty-five miles
per hour and states that the slower a car travels, the less
likely it would be to bottom out.
The evidence taken as a whole, would indicate that
a car traversing this crossing at a speed of from twelve
to fifteen miles an hour would not bottom out. The only
possible conclusion that a reasonable mind could draw,
is that the rail in question was left so high as to constitute
a hazard to vehicular traffic.

7
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL
ro GRANT PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL.

The Court erred in its refusal to grant Plaintiff's
motion for a new trial. The same considerations which
would require a directed verdict also compel a new trial.
f n hoth cases the moving party's evidence is such that it
can lead to one conclusion. In neither case would the
opposing party have sustained its burden of proof. In
ihjs case, there is no competent evidence that the Plaintiff
faded to use due care and caution in the control and
operation of her vehicle, nor could she, in the normal
course of things, observe the danger which the Defendant had created. In short, there is no evidence to support
the jury's findings. In such cases it is well settled that
the trial Court has the power to set the jury's verdict
aside and to grant a new trial. The rational is that the
jury has either misconstrued he evidence, been Gonfused,
or has ignored the Court's instructions. To let a verdict
stand where there is no competent evidence to support it,
is to deny to the Plaintiff her right to trial by jury. In
the case of Saltas vs. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 Pac. 2d,
171, the Court held, "A new trial may be granted upon
the Court's own motion when there has been such a plain
disregard by the jury of the instructions of the Court on
the evidence in the case as to satisfy the Court that the
verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such
instructions or under the influence of passion or prejudice." Moffat, C. J., "While we so stated, we also held
that the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for
the jury. On the ground of adequacy of the verdict alone,
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the Court may not inter£ere with the jury's verdict H
ever, if inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict p.re ow.
.
.
h
h . d
sent1
a situation t at sue ma equacy or excessiveness sh ,
a disregard by the jury of the evidence or the instruct?\V)
1011.1
of the Court as to the law applicable to the case as t,
satisfy the Court that the verdict was rendered undeo
such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence 0~
instructions or under the influence of passion or prejudice,
then the Court may exercise its discretion in the interest
of justice and grant a new trial."
32 C.J.S., p. 116, Section 1042, "A verdict or find.
ing must be based on the evidence and must be based
on the facts proved. Under this well established rule, the
verdict or finding cannot rest on surmise or speculation.
Likewise, under the above mentioned well established
rule a verdict or finding cannot rest on conjecture. Likewise, under the above mentioned well established rule,
a verdict or finding cannot rest on guess, supposition, assumption, imagination, or suspicion. The evidence on
which the verdict or finding is based must be competent,
legal evidence, and must support every material fact; and
where there is no evidence, or the evidence as to a material issu eis insufficient, the decision should be against
the party having the burden of proof. The evidence must
be sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of those facts which the verdict or finding establishes ; the verdict or finding must be grounded on a reasonable certainty as to probabilities arising from a fair consideration of the evidence, and not on mere possibilities.
While there is no set formula for determining the
quantum of evidence required, each case being governed
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by its own circumstances, the verdict or findings must be

supported by substantial evidence. Under the above mentioned rule, according to the decisions, a scintilla of evidence is not sufficient."

See Seybold vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 121
Utah 61, 231 Pac. 2nd 174. "First, as to the question of
lights on the caboose: Was there sufficient evidence for
the jury to find it had no lights? We have no disagreement with the time-honored rule that if there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of the
fact, it will not be disturbed on review. But that means
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See 9 Wigmore,
3d Ed., Sec. 2494, for a discussion of the test to be applied
to the quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding
by the trier of fact. In that section, at page 296, he says,
"There was an old phrase that a mere scintilla of
evidence was sufficient; but this has been abandoned by
most courts."
Citing a plethora of cases. After referring to a variety of methods of phrasing the rule and a great many
authorities, he concludes the section with this:
"Perhaps the best statement of the test is:
Are there facts in evidence which if unanswered
would justify men of ordinary reason and fairness
in affirming the question which the plaintiff is
bound to maintain."
We approve the rule thus stated by Mr. Wigmore.
If there is any substantial competent evidence upon which
a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the finding, it should stand. But if the finding is so plainly unreasonable as to convince the court that no jury acting
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fairly and reasonably could make the finding it
.
'
cann01
be said to be supported by substantial evidence. See 1
20 Am. Jr. 1033."
a so
Dem vs. Carbon County Land Company, 94 lltah
76-75 Pac. 2nd 660. "A finding of fact cannot be based 0
.
.
n
surmise, con1ecture, guess or speculation." Jensen '".
Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 Pac. 1034. "In this jurisdiction
the binding effect of findings of the trial court in law
cases is different from that in equity cases. In the former
the findings, as a general rule, are a pp roved if there ~
sufficient competent evidence to support them, and, ordinarily, are not disturbed, unless it is manifest that thri·
are so clearly against the weight of the evidence as :o
indicate a misconception, or not a due consideration of it.''
),

Spackman vs. Benefit Association of Railway Em.
ployees, 97 Utah, 91, 89 Pac. 2d, 490: Moffat, C. J.,
"A verdict of a jury may not be based upon testimony
showing only possibility or such situations as requires a
jury to base its verdict upon conjecture, speculation or
suspense. Edwards vs. Clark, et al., 96 Utah, 121, 83 Pac.
2d 1021.
Valiotis vs. Utah-Apex Mining Company, 55 Utah
151, 184 Pac., 802, Pratt, D. J., "If it should appear that
the evidence on which the verdict is based is so incredible
or inherently improbable or so inconsistent with or con·
trary to natural laws or physical facts, as to impel but
the one conclusion that the verdict is the result of mistak~
prejudice, or passion, we might then very properly say
that the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence,
or that there is not a substantial conflict of evidence, and
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thcrcf ore the lower court abused its discretion or erred
in refusing to grant the new trial. In such a case we look
into the evidence, examine its legal effect, and opposing
logical tendencies, if any, not for the purpose of deciding
1.h~' facts, as we may do in equity cases, but to determine
\\ hcthcr or not the trial court erred in its application of
fixrd legal principles. Our power or authority to do so
musL of course, be exercised cautiously; but the fact that
an incautious exercise of such power may transcend our
cnnstitutional authority in cases at law to hear and
(:f·tcnnine questions of law only is not inconsistent with
its cx1~tcnce. A question of law is never an abstract question It arises only with respect to ascertained facts or
tb·ir logical and legal tendencies as matter of proof. The
inquiry then is: What are the facts? And, secondly, what
is the legal principle applicable thereto? If the evidence,
taken as a whole, be reasonably susceptible of opposite
conclusions as to the existence or nonexistence of an
ultimate fact, depending upon inferences to be drawn
therefrom, or the weight to be given to the testimony of
this or that witness, or set of witnesses, we must conclusively presume the fact to be such as will support the
ruling which we are called upon to review; but if, after
giving due consideration to the fact that the trial judge
is better able to weigh conflicting evidence, the evidence
be such nevertheless as to impel but one reasonable conclusion, and that as to a fact adverse to the ruling, it
would be our duty as an appellate court to so declare,
notwithstanding there might be some conflict in the evidence."
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In Stafford vs. Adams, 113 Mo. App. 71 7, 88 S.W
1130, the court said:
·
"It is the duty of courts to determine what cons·
tutes substantial evidence, and the business of the tri~l·
of fact to settle conflicts therein."
rs
And the same court, in Brockman Commission Cc.
vs. Aaron, 145 Mo. App. 307, 130 S.W. 16, said:
"While appellate courts uniformly adhere to
the rule that the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony are issues of
fact and not of law, the rule has never been carried
to the length of requiring courts to accord probative value to testimony that is so palpably false
or absurd that no reasonable mind would give it
any credence. It is within the province of the court
to ascertain whether or not testimony has any
evidentiary strength, and, if it is found to be im·
potent, to cast it aside as though it had not been
given."
In the case of Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. vs. Howe,
191 Fed. 776, at page 782, 112 C.C.A. 262, at page 268,
"substantial evidence" is defined with reference to the
facts of that case as follows:
"It must be said Judge Severens, some·
thing of substance and relevant consequence, and
not vague, uncertain or irrelevant ~atte~ not
carrying the quality of "proof" or havmg f1tne&1
to induce conviction.' "
And again, at page 785, of 191 Fed., at page 271
of 112 C.C.A.:
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"If the circumstances are such that it can be
said fair-minded men might not agree as to the
conclusions to be drawn, the case must be submitted to the jury."

In Newton vs. Railroad Co., 43 Utah, at page 229,
i 3+ Pac. at page 5 71, this court said:
"If it is clear that the injured person failed
to exercise ordinary care, the question is one of
law; but, if the circumstances are such as to leave
that question shrouded in doubt to the extent that
different minds may fairly and honestly arrive at
different conclusions, then it is a question of fact."

We submit the Court in the case at bar, erred in its
refusal to grant a new trial based upon the insufficiency
of the evidence of any negligence or misconduct on the
part of the Plaintiff.
POINT 3
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A
JUDGMENT UPON INCONSISTENT JURY FINDINGS.
The jury found Proposition # 1 and Proposition #2
to be false. In substance the propositions were that the
defendant created an unobservable hazard for vehicular
traffic by leaving the rail too high. The jury then went
on to find Proposition # 3 to be true. The defendant was
negligent in failing to warn the plaintiff by signs or otherwise of the danger in crossing the tracks. If it were not
the danger created by the high rail, then it can only be
speculation as to what other danger the jury refers to in
Proposition #3. The Kansas Supreme Court in the case
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of King vs. Vets Cab Inc., 179 Kansas 379 295 p ,
.
.
'
ac. ld.
605, 56 A.L.R. 2d 1249, discusses mconsistent
·
Th
C
special
. d"
fm
mgs.
at ourt holds that the trial Court ,
.
h .
.
.
ma,
not ignore sue mconsistencies and must upon pro ·
.
. 1.
per
motion
ord er a new tna
"We next turn to defendant's contention that the
court erred in overruling its motion for judgment on the
answers to the special questions. Did these answers to
the questions compel the court to set aside the general
verdict and render judgment in favor of defendant, or
grant a new trial? It is an elementary rule that a general
verdict in favor of a party to an action imports a findmg
in his favor upon all issues in the case, not inconsistent
with the special findings, and nothing will be preSlUileJ
in favor of the special findings. They shall be given such
construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony
with the general verdict, and the court is not permitted
to isolate one answer and ignore others, but is required
to consider all of them together, and if one interpretation
leads to inconsistency, and another to harmony with the
general verdict, the latter is to be adopted. Marley vs.
Wichita Transportation Corp., 150 Kan. 818, 96 P. 2d
877; Sams vs. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 157 Kan.
278, 130 P. 2d 859. The general verdict may be set aside
only when the special findings are contrary to the verdict
and compel judgment setting aside the general verdict as
a matter of law. Unless the effect of special findings,
when considered as a whole, is such as to overthrow the
general verdict, the verdict must stand. Johnson-Sampson
Construction Co. vs. Casterline Grain & Seed, Inc., 173
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Kan. 763, 252 P. 2d 893. With the foregoing rules of
la\i· in mind, it is apparent the jury found by its answer
to question No. 3 that plaintiff's fall was not the result
of an unavoidable accident, and by its answer to question
)io. 2. defendant was negligent in that plaintiff was havin" difficulty in descending from the cab, and the driver
sh~uld have assisted her. In view of the answer to question No. 2, the general verdict and the evidence, it is
,1 b\·iou:'. that the jury found plaintiff was having difficulty
in alighting from the cab and that she had requested
assistance from the driver, and he was guilty of negligence
m not rendering assistance. By its answer to question No.
L the jury found plaintiff was guilty of negligence only
to the extent that she did not wait for reasonable assist:ince from the driver in alighting from the vehicle. The
jur;: did not find by direct answer that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence. The answer is not clear,
definite and certain. It is ambiguous and too uncertain
to be a basis for a valid judgment in favor of the defendant on the theory that she was guilty of contributory
negligence. It is inconsistent with the answer to ques~ion
No. 2. In one answer, the jury finds that the driver should
have assisted her, implying that he had opportunity and
time to do so, and in the other that she did not wait for
assistance, whatever the term "wait" implies. Consistent
special findings control the general verdict when contrary thereto, but when they are inconsistent with one
another, some showing a right to a verdict, and others
showing the contrary, the case is left in the condition of
really being undecided, and a new trial should be granted.
Willis vs. Skinner, 89 Kan. 145, 130 P. 673; Packer vs.
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Fairmont Creamery Co., 158 Kan. 191 146 p ')d
'
. ... 40 I
McCoy vs. Weber, .168 Kan. 241, 212 P. 2d
281
In re Estate. of Erwm, 170 Kan. 728 ' 228 p . 2d ~/j~·
.. '
89 CJS, Tnal #552, p. 307. It cannot be said that th,
defendant was entitled to judgment on the answe :e
rs •'J
the special questions."
.It. is ~ot only within .the bound.s of the trial judge.
but it is his duty to set aside a verdict where a jury has
failed to follow the Court's instructions or has made inconsistent findings on propositions submitted to it. "Vir.
ginian R.R. Company vs. Armantrout, 166 Fed. 400, 4
A.LR. 2d 1064. The law gives ample power to see that
justice is done in cases pending before him; and the
responsibility attendant upon such power is his in full
measure. While according due respect to the findings of
the jury, he should not hesitate to set aside their verdict
and grant a new trial in any case where the ends of
justice so require. Aetna Casualty & ~urety Co. v. Yeatts,
A Cir., 122 F 2d 350.
The power of this court to reverse the trial court
for failure to exercise the power, where such failure, as
here, amounts to an abuse of discretion, is likewise clear.
It is true that under #22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
28 USCA #879, there may be no reversal on writ of
error for any error in fact; and this rule has been fre·
quently applied where reversal is sought because damages
are excessive or inadequate. Fairmont Glass Works vs.
Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 US 4 74, 53 S. Ct. 252, 77 L. ed
439. We do not understand the rule to have application,
however, in those exceptional circumstances where the
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"erdict is so manifestly without support in the evidence
that failure to set it aside amounts to an abuse of discretion. In a situation of that sort, reversal is no more
based on "error in fact" than reversal for refusal to direct
a verdict for insufficiency of evidence. Whether there has
been an abuse of discretion is a question of law in the
one case, just as is the legal sufficiency of the evidence in
the other. An appelaute court is not required to place
the seal of its approval upon a judgment vitiated by an
abuse of discretion."
The inconsistent findings are no findings. It is as if
the Court has entered judgment upon no verdict at all.
The jury here has failed in its duty to determine the
facts. The only remedy in this event is to order the matter
tried anew.
CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiff and appellant herein, submits in conclusion,
that there was no evidence offered at the time of the trial
to support defendant's position that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent or that she in any way was guilty of
any improper conduct which tended to cause the injuries
of which she complains. She was therefore entitled to
have the jury determine only the question of the extent of
her damages and she was further entitled to an order
from the Court directing the jury to find liability on the
part of the defendant. To cure this error in the District
Court's ruling, appellant herein submits that she is en-
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titled to have this case remanded to the District Court
for a new trial granted.
Respectfully submitted,

LAMAR DUNCAN
DONALD SAWAYA
706 Phillips Petroleum Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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